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Abstract 
 
In line with the recent research and debates about econophysics and financial 
economics, this article discusses on usual misunderstandings between the two 
disciplines in terms of modelling and basic hypotheses. In the literature devoted to 
econophysics, the methodology used by financial economists is frequently considered 
as a top-down approach (starting from a priori “first principles”) while econophysicists 
rather present themselves as scholars working with a (empirical data prone) bottom-up 
approach. Although this dualist perspective is very common in the econophysics 
literature, this paper claims that the distinction is very confusing and does not permit to 
reveal the essence of the differences between finance and econophysics. The 
distinction between these two fields is mainly investigated here through the lens of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis in order to show that, in substance, econophysics and 
financial economics tend to have a similar approach implying that the misunderstanding 
between these two fields at the modelling level can therefore be overstepped. 
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I) Introduction 
 
This article is a contribution in line with the recent research aiming to increase the 
dialogue between physicists (particularly econophysicists) and financial economists 
(Ausloos, 2001, 2013; Bouchaud, 2002; Bouchaud et al., 2002; Carbone et al., 2007; 
Chakrabarti & Chakraborti, 2010; Chen & Li, 2012; Durlauf, 2005, 2012; Farmer & Lux, 
2008; Gabaix, 2009; Jovanovic & Schinckus, 2015, 2016; Keen, 2003; Lux, 2009; 
McCauley, 2006, 2009; McCauley et al., 2007; Potters & Bouchaud, 2003; Sornette, 
2014; Stanley & Plerou, 2001). Actually, a recent article by Sornette (2014) offers a 
titillating example of largely widespread confusions about the distinction between 
econophysics and financial economics. We claim here that the cross-fertilization 
between econophysics and financial economics requires an objective clarification of both 
approaches in order to open the door for an interdisciplinary and fruitful dialogue.  
 
The misunderstanding evoked above seems to be rooted in the difference, pointed out 
by Sornette (2014), between the way of modelling in economics and how it is done in 
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physics, which is broadly resumed by the “difference between empirically founded 
science and normative science” (Sornette, 2014, p. 3). As explained,  
 
“The difference between [the model for the best estimate for the fundamental 
price from physics] and [the model for the best estimate for the fundamental price 
from financial economic, i.e. efficient market theory] is at the core of the difference 
in the modeling strategies of economists, that can be called top-down (or from 
rational expectations and efficient markets), compared with the bottom-up or 
microscopic approach of physicists” (Sornette, 2014, p. 7). 
 
This distinction between the ways of modelling provides the corner argument for 
explaining the major differences between the two disciplines. Actually, this opposition is 
also used for claiming that modelling in economics can be looked on as a “puzzle” which  
 
“refers to problems posed by empirical observations that do not conform to the 
predictions based on theory” (Sornette, 2014, p. 5).  
 
In order to give up such a kind of puzzle, Sornette (2014, p. 7) suggested to use this 
distinction for formulating an (econo)physics definition of the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) compatible with the bottom-up approach. We thoroughly re-examine this 
“solution” from a fundamental conceptual way and from a critical analysis of the EMH. 
 
This dualist perspective (top-down vs. bottom-up) is frequently found in the 
econophysics literature (Bouchaud & Challet, 2014; Bouchaud & Potters, 2003; Challet 
et al., 2005, p. 14; McCauley, 2004, 2006; Rickles, 2008; Schinckus, 2010; Stanley et 
al., 1999, p. 157). It is also a common argument for questioning the use of the Gaussian 
framework in a large number of financial economists’ works. However, the argument 
based on this distinction is very confusing. It could even shock some financial 
economists who face regularly critiques about the too micro-focused knowledge usually 
implemented in finance. In the same vein, from a financial point of view, a lot of 
publications from econophysicists appear to be mainly phenomenological focusing on a 
macro-description of financial markets/economic systems. 
 
This classical opposition between econophysics and financial economics cannot be 
reduced to a couple of dualism: empirical science vs. normative science or micro vs. 
macro perspectives. Actually the opposition between these two fields is not obvious. We 
will investigate this point by arguing that, surprisingly, econophysicists and financial 
economists use a quite similar approach for analysing financial markets. However, their 
approaches appear to be different because these scientists are trained in “different 
schools” with different aims/vocabularies. We will illustrate this aspect in the following 
sections, yet wondering if it is only a matter of words. We will conclude by claiming that 
econophysics and financial economics tend to have a similar approach, although their 
respective backgrounds lead to present it differently. Therefore, the misunderstanding 
between these two fields can be overstepped. 
 
 
II) Is it only a matter of words? 
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No. This scientifically antagonistic situation is not only a matter of words. The gap 
between econophysicists and financial economists is deeper than just a problem of 
translation. We rather demonstrate that the misunderstanding so often evoked in the 
literature, results from an inappropriate comparison between the methodology (i.e. use 
of assumptions) and the modelling process (i.e. how to implement 
assumptions/approach) used by economists and physicists. According to some 
econophysicists, the “modelling strategies of economists can be called top-down” 
because “financial modeler builds a model or a class of models based on a pillar of 
standard economic thinking, such as efficient markets, rational expectations, 
representative agents” (Sornette, 2014, p. 5). However, it is worth mentioning that 
rational expectations or efficient market are hypotheses about the economic reality. In 
accordance with this formulation, economists usually start their analysis with 
assumptions that they implement in their way of modelling and from which they deduce 
conclusions that are tested. In other words, Sornette associated what he called “top-
down” modelling with the hypothetico-deductive approach mainly used in economics.  
 
Regarding this methodological aspect, econophysics is, in contrast, often presented as a 
data-driven field founded on descriptive models resulting from observations. First of all, it 
is important to remind that the belief in no a priori is, on itself, an a priori since it refers to 
a form of positivism1. The positivism (research methodology) takes the stance that the 
scientist knowledge exists independently from the social actors. In opposition to these, 
the interpretivism is more concerned about the different views that (social) agents have 
towards some phenomenon. Secondly, the inductive and data driven approach 
implemented by econophysicists can be seen as a “bottom up” methodology because it 
starts with data related to a specific phenomenon rather than starting with assumptions 
on it. The recurrence of observations allows scholars to make some generalizations for 
other similar phenomena. Why does it matter to mention this point? Simply to clarify that 
the words “top down” and “bottom up” refer to methodological strategies and not to a 
way of modelling. 
 
The difference between methodology and modelling seems subtle, but it is important: 
the methodology refers to the conceptual way of dealing with phenomena, i.e. 
quantitatively vs. qualitatively; empirically vs. theoretically. By contrary, the modelling 
way rather concerns the kind of computation (and data) used by scientists. A opposition 
between econophysics and financial economics with a confusion on these two levels led 
several authors (McCauley, 2006; Sornette, 2014) to deal with a very specific part of the 
literature related to these two areas of knowledge. On the one hand, although a part of 
economics is well-known for its representative agent modelling, this field does not 
necessary implement a top-down modelling as claimed by Sornette. Agent based 
modelling, for instance, is a common practice in economics and financial economics 
(Chen, 2012; Gilbert, 2007; LeBaron, 2000, 2006; Tesfatsion, 2001, 2003), enforcing the 
micro-oriented modelling already used in these fields. On the other hand, a large part of 
the literature in econophysics is dedicated to the phenomenological macro-description of 
                                            
1 Different views about “knowledge” exist of course, for further information about this point, see (Saunders 
et al., 2012, p. chap. 4). 
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the evolution of financial prices making these works inappropriate for being considered 
as “bottom up” modelling. One can mention, among other works, Takayasu and 
Takayasu (2016) who observed that the large fluctuations on the financial markets can 
be captured through a power law, while Levy (2003) or Klass et al (2006) confirmed the 
conclusion made by Pareto (1897) more than one century ago showing that wealth and 
income distribution can both statistically be characterized by a power law2. In the same 
vein, Amaral et al. (1997) explained that the annual growth rates for US manufacturing 
companies can also be described through a power law whereas Axtell (2001), Luttmer 
(2007) or Gabaix and Landier (2008) claimed that this statistical framework can also be 
used to characterize the evolution of the firms size as a variable of their assets, market 
capitalization or number of employee. These “size models” have afterwards been 
applied for describing the evolution of the cities size (Cordoba, 2008; Eeckhout, 2004; 
Gabaix, 1999). Although this phenomenological tradition considers that economic 
systems are composed of multiply interacting components (no learning agents), these 
components are assumed to interact in such a way that they generate macro-properties 
for systems (Rickles, 2008). Thus, because this methodology induces macro-properties 
in terms of statistical regularities without defining in details all aspects of the micro-level, 
it cannot really be considered as a bottom-up approach. 
 
By misunderstanding the epistemic role of the key concepts in financial economics, such 
as the EMH, rational expectations etc., some econophysicists criticize financial 
economics and emphasize its weaknesses from a perspective that is not at all an issue 
for financial economists. Moreover, as Lux (2009, p. 230) already recalled 
 
“[o]ne often finds [in the literature from econophysics] a scolding of the carefully 
maintained straw man image of traditional finance. In particular, ignoring decades 
of work in dozens of finance journals, it is often claimed that “economists believe 
that the probability distribution of stock returns is a Gaussian”, claim that can 
easily be refuted by a random consultation of any of the learned journals of this 
field”.  
 
True! It is well known that economists identified stylized facts on stock price extreme 
variations and their leptokurticity several decades before the emergence of 
econophysics (Bowley, 1933; Houthakker, 1961; Larson, 1960; Mills, 1927; Mitchell, 
1915; Olivier, 1926)3. In the same vein, since the 1970s, financial economists have 
developed several models to take into account extreme values, like jump-diffusion 
models (Merton, 1976; Press, 1967) or the ARCH types models empirically implemented 
by financial economists (Bollerslev, 1986; Engle, 1982)4. 
 
In other words, we claim that the dualism top-down vs. bottom-up is not appropriate to 
oppose financial economics and econophysics because this criterion is usually applied 
                                            
2 We can also mention Mantegna and Stanley (1994), Lux (1996), Bak et al. (1997), Ausloos (2000), 
Gligor and Ignat (2001), Alvarez-Ramirez et al. (2001), Alvarez-Ramirez et al. (2002), Hsu and Lin (2002), 
Gabaix et al. (2003), and Yura et al. (2014). 
3 See Lux (2009) or Jovanovic and Schinckus (2013) for further details. 
4 See Francq and Zakoian (2010), Bauwens et al. (2006), Tim (2010) and Pagan (1996) for further details 
on these categories of models. 
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at two different levels: when econophysics consider that financial economics is based on 
a top-down approach, they usually refer to the methodology used by economists; – in 
contrast, when they claim they are using a bottom-up approach, econophysicists are 
arguing on their way of modelling as in statistical physics. This confusion can therefore 
lead to a deaf dialogue and an intellectual conservatism narrowing the possibility of 
interactions between both communities. 
 
 
III) Comparing apples with pears 
 
Sornette rooted the opposition between econophysics and financial economics in the 
three inter-related pillars of contemporary physics that are “experiments, theory and 
numerical simulations” (Sornette, 2014, p. 2). It is worth mentioning that these 
methodological “pillars” also exist in economics. Experimental economics is a very well 
know field in economics (Guala, 2008; Roth, 1993; Smith, 1992). We can also mention 
that in 2002 Smith and Kahneman received the ‘Nobel prize’ distinction for their 
contributions in experimental economics. Moreover, experimental finance has its own 
journal, the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance. Computational economics 
(including computational financial economics) is also a well know active field (Amman et 
al., 1996; Bloomfield, 2010; Miranda & Fackler, 2002) with its own journals like the 
Computational Economics (the journal of the Society for Computational Economics) or 
the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. However, by making wrongfully 
comparisons between two different conceptual levels, many econophysicists fuel the 
misunderstanding: indeed, it is very common for econophysicists to compare the results 
of their statistical models with the theoretical framework of financial economics (efficient 
market hypothesis). For instance, when Sornette explains that econophysics deals with 
a microscopic approach, he implicitly discusses the way of dealing with data 
(experimental level) that he compared with the EMH which refers to the theoretical level 
and not to an experimental level. In this context, it is a truism to claim that the 
experimental level is closer to reality than theoretical one (whatever the field). While we 
acknowledge that these three conceptual levels are interrelated, an interdisciplinary 
comparison makes sense only if one compares the same conceptual levels. 
 
If econophysicists wish to compare (the statistical) models used in both disciplines, they 
should compare their models with ARCH class of models. Surprisingly, even though 
econophysicists and economists do not have in general the same methodology (the 
former are data-driven while the latter start with assumptions), both communities of 
researchers do proceed in a similar way regarding the implementation of models: both 
follow a bottom-up approach by calibrating their models in order to simulate features 
(e.g., price or return variations). The difference refers to the way of modelling the 
extreme values: econophysicists consider these values as a part of the system while 
economists rather associate these extreme values with an error terms to which they give 
a statistical distribution. In other words, economists mainly describe stylized facts in two 
steps: 1) a general trend (assumed to be ruled by a Brownian uncertainty) whose 2) 
variations follow a conditional distribution for which a calibration is required. For these 
conditional distributions, it goes without discussion that data-driven calibration (i.e. 
without theoretical justification) is common in financial economics. In fact, such an 
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approach has also generated methodological debates among economists, for instance, 
about the relevance of a strictly data-driven approach in the field: one can mention the 
Koopmans-Vining debate at the end the 1940s (Mirowski, 1989), or more recently, the 
Vector Autoregressions (VARs) modelling (Chari et al., 2008, 2009; Christiano, 2012) or 
the Real Business Cycle (RBC) models approach (Eichenbaum, 1996; Hansen & 
Heckman, 1996; Hoover, 1995; Quah, 1995; Sims, 1996). The ARCH class of models, 
which is a statistical modelling approach, based on unlimited arbitrary inputs without 
theoretical interpretations, has faced with the same criticisms as that of physicists, from 
a financial economists’ viewpoint (Pagan, 1996), particularly because these models can 
“not provide an avenue towards an explanation of the empirical regularities” (Lux, 2006). 
 
Nevertheless, although both communities use a similar calibration approach, one can 
observe a paradoxical situation: financial economists accept calibration models (as 
ARCH class modeling for instance) but they have difficulties to accept it for the models 
coming from statistical physics that are more based on physics conceptual ideas than 
statistical considerations. This position needs to be clarified. Jovanovic and Schinckus 
(2015, 2016) have detailed and explained this paradox by showing that the major 
differences between the two fields appears in the way of calibrating their models. 
Roughly speaking, calibration made in econophysics mainly results from data whereas it 
is rather founded on a statistical assumption (Brownian uncertainty) in finance. 
Concretely, ARCH models are closely combined with a theoretical explanation since 
they were introduced in finance with the purpose to test the EMH. This hypothesis 
constitutes one of the major theoretical foundations of the financial economics’ 
framework (Fama, 1991; Jovanovic, 2002, 2010; Jovanovic & Schinckus, 2016; Malkiel, 
1992). It is worth mentioning that the EMH is hardly testable and that any empirical test 
of this hypothesis refers to what it is called in the literature a joint-test. A joint-test refers 
to the fact that, on a given market, any test of the efficiency (i.e. the fact prices fully 
reflect available information) tests at the same time the notion of efficiency and the 
asset-pricing model used to price securities on this market. In other words, any empirical 
refutation can be due to either the fact that the market is not efficient or the model used 
is not appropriate for the test5. 
 
Such a joint-test implies that market efficiency per se is not testable (Campbell et al., 
1997; Cuthbertson, 2004; Fama, 1976; Jovanovic, 2010; LeRoy, 1976, 1989; Lo, 2000), 
and any test of efficiency has to be considered carefully. We will clarify this point 
afterwards. This link between ARCH models and the EMH explains why most of financial 
economists using ARCH class of models consider their models have theoretical 
foundations from a financial (and not from statistical only) point of view. In this 
perspective, calibration in financial economics appears as an empirical test of theoretical 
hypothesis. 
 
At this stage, econophysicists and financial economists have the same procedure for 
modelling (calibration of models to fit data) but the latter combine the calibration step 
                                            
5 We can mention that this joint-test is similar to the question arising from Benford law application: is a lack 
of conformity either intrinsic to the analysed system or is it because Benford should not apply? (Ausloos et 
al., 2014; Raimi, 1976) 
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with a specific theoretical framework while the former claim to be more empirical data-
driven. By combining a theoretical framework to set up the initial calibration of the 
formalized systems, the “model becomes an a priori hypothesis about real phenomena” 
(Haavelmo, 1944, p. 8). Although some econophysicists (McCauley, 2006; Sornette, 
2014) criticize this theoretical dependence of the modelling in finance, it is worth 
mentioning that physics also provides telling similar examples in which a theoretical 
framework is accepted while the empirical results are wholly incompatible with this 
framework. One could mention the example of the more recent Higgs Boson discovery 
(Allen, 2014; Allen & Lidström, 2015). The concept of the Higgs Boson pre-existed to its 
observation meaning that its theoretical framework was assumed during several years 
without observing this particle (Morrison, 2015). In the same vein, the often discussed 
string theory is an elegant mathematical framework whose empirical/concrete evidences 
are still on debates (Aganagic, 2016). This is not the unique counterexample, “there are 
plenty of physicists who appear to be unperturbed about working in a manner detached 
from experiment: quantum gravity, for example. Here, the characteristic scales are 
utterly inaccessible, there is no experimental basis, and yet the problem occupies the 
finest minds in physics” (Rickles, 2008, p. 14). 
 
	
IV) What is wrong with EMH? 
 
After having nuanced the (not so different) ways of modelling in the two fields, we can 
now examine the common critique made by econophysicists about the EMH. Actually, 
Sornette’s paper (2014) is also a telling example of the critiques econophysicists 
address to EMH showing another confusion relative to the status of this hypothesis. 
Broadly, why keeping the EMH given it is refuted by the fact that stock market variations 
are not Gaussian. In this perspective, the EMH is often presented as an a priori 
hypothesis by econophysicists. However, the status of this hypothesis is confusing. The 
EMH has a very specific place in financial economics that is unclear for most of 
econophysicists as well as for most of financial economists, particularly because the 
EMH is generally identified to the Brownian motion or to the random character of stock 
market variations. 
 
The EMH was proposed in the 1960s on the intuition that a pure random-walk model 
would verify two properties of competitive economic equilibrium: the absence of marginal 
profit and the equalisation of a stock’s price and value, meaning that the price perfectly 
reflects the available information6. This project was undeniably a tour de force at that 
time: creating a hypothesis that made it possible to incorporate econometric results and 
statistics on the random nature of stock-market variations into the theory of economic 
equilibrium (Jovanovic, 2008, 2010; Sewell, 2011). It is through this link that one of the 
main foundations of current financial economics was laid down and that the importance 
of the pure random-walk model, or Brownian motion, and thus of the Gaussian 
distribution, can be explained: validating the random nature of stock-market variations 
                                            
6 It is worth mentioning that while use of a random-walk model to represent stock-market variations was 
first proposed in 1863 by a French stockbroker, Jules Regnault, and then formalized by the mathematician 
Louis Bachelier (Bachelier, 1900; Davis & Etheridge, 2006), the EMH was created in the 1960s. 
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would, in effect, establish that prices on competitive financial markets are in permanent 
equilibrium as a result of the effects of competition. This is what the EMH should be: the 
random character of stock market variations would imply that the prices reflect the 
competitive equilibrium by incorporating the available information.  
 
Unfortunately, this hypothesis does not really reach this goal. To establish the link 
between the empirical observations on the random character of stock-market variations, 
a stochastic model (i.e. Brownian motion) and the theory of economic equilibrium, Fama 
extended the early theoretical thinking of the 1960s and transposed onto financial 
markets the concept of free competitive equilibrium on which rational agents would act 
(1965b, p. 56). Such a market would be characterised by the equalisation of stock prices 
with their equilibrium value. This value is determined by a valuation model; the choice of 
this model is irrelevant for the EMH. In Fama’s thesis, this equilibrium value is the 
fundamental – or intrinsic – value of a security. The signification of this value is 
unimportant: it may be the equilibrium value determined by a general equilibrium model, 
or a convention shared by “sophisticated traders” (Fama, 1965a, pp. 36, fn 33).  
 
Notwithstanding, Fama later dropped the reference to a convention and stated that the 
equilibrium model valued stocks using all available information in accordance with the 
idea of competitive markets. Following the most commonly accepted definition of 
efficiency proposed by Fama in his 1970 paper, on an efficient market, equalisation of 
the price with the equilibrium value meant that any available information was included in 
prices. Consequently, that information has no value in predicting future price changes: 
future prices are independent of past prices. For this reason, Fama considered that, in 
an efficient market, price variations should be random, like the arrival of new information, 
and that therefore implies an impossibility to beat the market (Fama, 1965a, p. 35 or 98). 
A random-walk model made possible to simulate dynamic evolution of prices in a free 
competitive market that is in constant equilibrium. In other terms, the market is 
Markovian; it has no memory. 
 
Fama started his demonstration from empirical observations, particularly the existence 
of different agents and behaviours on financial markets. According to him, “there is no 
strong reason to expect that each individual’s estimates of intrinsic values will be 
independent of the estimates made by others (i.e., noise may be generated in a 
dependent fashion). For example, certain individuals or institutions may be opinion 
leaders in the market. That is, their actions may induce people to change their opinions 
concerning the prospects of a given company” (Fama, 1965a, p. 37). Consequently, for 
the purpose of demonstrating these properties, Fama assumed the existence of two 
kinds of traders: the “sophisticated traders” and the “others”. In this perspective, 
“sophisticated traders” are those who influence the market. Fama’s key assumption was 
that “sophisticated traders”, due to their skills, make a better estimate of the 
intrinsic/fundamental value than other agents do by using all available information. 
Moreover, Fama assumes that, “although there are sometimes discrepancies between 
actual prices and intrinsic values, sophisticated traders in general feel that actual prices 
usually tend to move toward intrinsic values” (1965a, p. 38). Since “sophisticated 
traders” share the same valuation model for asset prices (Fama, 1965a, p. 40), their 
transactions will help prices trend towards the fundamental value. Fama added, using 
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arbitrage reasoning, that any new information is immediately reflected in prices (1965a, 
p. 39). The independence of price variations, resulting from the random arrival of new 
information, and the absence of profit being two characteristics of the random walk 
model allow Fama to make a direct connection between this model and the market 
efficiency. In other words, by assuming that sophisticated traders’ have financial abilities 
superior to those of other agents, Fama showed that the random nature of stock-market 
variations is synonymous with dynamic economic equilibrium in a free competitive 
market. 
 
But when the time came to demonstrate mathematically the intuition of the link between 
information and the random (independent) nature of stock-market variations, Fama 
became elusive. He explicitly attempted to link the EMH with the random nature of stock-
market variations in an article published in 1970. Seeking to generalise, he dropped all 
direct references to the notion of “fundamental value” and to “sophisticated traders”. 
Consequently, all agents were assumed to use the same model for evaluating the price 
of financial assets (i.e. representative agent hypothesis). Finally, he kept the general 
hypothesis that “the conditions of market equilibrium can (somehow) be stated in terms 
of expected returns” (1970, p. 384). He formalised this hypothesis by using the definition 
of a martingale: 
 
, with ,  (1) 
 
where the tilde indicates that the variable is random, and  represent the price and 
return for a period of the asset j, E(./.) the conditional expectation operator, and  
represents all information at the time t.  
 
This equation implies that “the information  would be determined from the particular 
expected return theory at hand” (1970, p. 384). Fama added that “this is the sense in 
which  is ‘fully reflected’ in the formation of the price ” (1970, p. 384). To test the 
hypothesis of information on efficiency, he suggested that from this equation one can 
obtain the mathematical expression of a fair game, which is one of the characteristics of 
a martingale model and a random-walk model. A demonstration of this link would ensure 
that a martingale model or a random-walk model could test the double characteristic of 
efficiency: total incorporation of information into prices and the nullity of expected return. 
 
This is the most well-known and used formulation of the EMH. However, it is important 
to mention that the history of the EMH went beyond the Fama (1970) article. Indeed, in 
1976, LeRoy showed that Fama’s demonstration is tautological and that his hypothesis 
is not testable. Fama answered by changing his definition and admitted that any test of 
the EMH is a test of both market efficiency and the model of equilibrium used by 
investors (Fama, 1976). Moreover, he modified his mathematical formulation: 
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where 𝐸! 𝑅!,! Φ!!!!  is the equilibrium expected return on security j implied by the set of 
information now used by the market at t – 1, Φ!!!! , and 𝐸 𝑅!,! Φ!!!  is the true expected 
return implied by the set of information available at t – 1, Φ!!!. From then on, efficiency 
presupposed that, using Fama’s own terms, the market “correctly” evaluates the “true” 
density function conditional on all available information. Thus, in an efficient market, the 
truly perfect model for valuing the equilibrium price is available to agents. To test 
efficiency, Fama reformulated the notion of “expected return” by introducing a distinction 
between price – defined by the true valuation model – and agents’ expectations. The 
test consisted in verifying whether the return expected by the market based on the 
information used, , is equal to the expectation of true return obtained on the basis of 
all information available, . This true return is obtained by using the “true” model for 
determining the equilibrium price.  
 
Fama proposed testing the efficiency in two ways, both of which relied on the same 
process. The first test consisted in verifying whether “trading rules with abnormal 
expected returns do not exist” (1976, p. 144). In other words, this was a matter of 
checking that one could obtain the same return as that provided by the true model of 
assessment of the equilibrium value on the one hand and the set of available 
information on the other hand. The second test would look more closely at the set of 
information. It was to verify that “there is no way to use the information  available at t-
1 as the basis of a correct assessment of the expected return on security j which is other 
than its equilibrium expected value” (1976, p. 145).  
 
At the close of his 1976 article, Fama answered LeRoy’s criticisms: the new definition of 
efficiency was a priori testable (we will precise this point hereafter). It should be noted 
however that the definition of efficiency had changed: it now referred to the true model 
for assessing the equilibrium value. For this reason, testing efficiency required also 
testing that agents were using the true assessment model for the equilibrium value of 
assets. Fama acknowledged the difficulties involved in this joint test in a report on 
efficiency published in 1991 (Fama, 1991, pp. 1575-1576). The test would, then, consist 
in using a model for setting the equilibrium value of assets – the simplest would be to 
take the model actually used by operators – and determining the returns that the 
available information would generate; then to use the same model with the information 
that agents use. If the same result is obtained – that is, if equation (2) is verified – then 
all the other information would indeed have been incorporated into prices. It is striking to 
note that this test is independent of the random nature of stock-market variations. This is 
because, in this 1976 article, there is no more talk of random walk or martingale; no 
connection with a random process is necessary to test efficiency.  
 
Despite of this important conclusion, Fama’s article (1976) is practically not cited. Almost 
all financial economists refer to the 1970 article and keep the idea that to validate the 
random nature of stock-market variations means to validate market efficiency, fuelling 
the confusion between the market efficiency and the random character of stock market 
variations. However, this problem was rapidly pointed out. LeRoy (1973) and Lucas 
m
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(1978) provided theoretical proofs that efficient markets and the martingale hypothesis 
are two distinct ideas: a martingale is neither necessary nor sufficient for an efficient 
market. In a similar way, Samuelson (1973), who gave a mathematical proof that prices 
may be permanently equal to the intrinsic value and fluctuate randomly, explained that 
the making of profits by some agents cannot be ruled out, contrary to the original 
definition of the EMH. In the same vein, De Meyer and Saley (2003) showed that stock-
market prices can follow a martingale even if all available information is not reflected in 
the prices. We can also mention Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989), Longin (1996) 
and Cornell (2013) who showed that large daily price movements are not always related 
to the arrival of new information. In other terms, the EMH must be clearly dissociated 
from stochastic processes, including the Gaussian ones. 
 
Unfortunately, a proliferation of theoretical developments combined with the 
accumulation of the empirical works led to a confusing situation. Indeed, the definition of 
efficient markets has changed depending on the emphasis placed by each author on a 
particular feature. For instance, Fama et al. (1969, p. 1) defined an efficient market as “a 
market that adjusts rapidly to new information”; but Jensen (1978, p. 96) considered that 
“a market is efficient with respect to information set θt if it is impossible to make 
economic profit by trading on the basis of information set θt”; while according to Malkiel 
(1992) “the market is said to be efficient with respect to some information set […] if 
security prices would be unaffected by revealing that information to all participants. 
Moreover, efficiency with respect to an information set […] implies that it is impossible to 
make economic profits by trading on the basis of [that information set]”. 
 
To sum up, the EMH is a theoretical assumption that aims at giving a theoretical 
meaning to the random character of stock markets observed in the 1960s and at 
creating a scientific framework for finance (i.e. the financial economics) (Findlay & 
Williams, 2001; Jovanovic, 2008). However, it is important to keep in mind that the EMH 
and the random character of stock markets are two different elements: the Gaussian 
dimension of data is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for having EMH.  
 
By keeping the confusion between the EMH and the Gaussian stochastic processes 
authors, like Sornette (2014, section 3.1), believe that the evidence about the non-
Gaussian distribution of financial data should lead to reject the EMH. While Gaussian 
stochastic processes are not a valid test of the EMH, such a position misses in addition 
the fact that “prices always ‘fully reflect’ available information” (Fama, 1970, p. 383) is an 
ideal that does not exist. Precisely, as the next section will precise, EMH is rooted into 
the positivism defended by Friedman (Findlay & Williams, 2001) 7 . Given the 
contradictions discussed previously, econophysicists (and also financial economists) 
could legitimately ask why financial economists keep the EMH and the Gaussian 
stochastic processes and discuss them at length through papers and doctoral theses. 
 
 
                                            
7 Even theoretically, EMH is an ideal that does not exist. Indeed, very soon economists demonstrated that 
the mechanism of the market efficiency contains a theoretical contradiction and consequently, 
informationally efficient markets are impossible (Grossman, 1976; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1976, 1980). 
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V) Can one give up EMH? 
 
Roughly speaking, one can mention two major reasons explaining why financial 
economists keep EMH and its association with Gaussian process: 1) the role of the EMH 
in the construction of a social reality; 2) the use of statistical tests for validating a 
hypothesis or a model in economics. 
 
The reason explaining why financial economists keep the EMH as a paradigm stems 
from a classical opposition between social sciences and physics (Eto, 2008). Whereas 
physicists are aware about their influence on the measure of physical phenomena, they 
do not influence the essence of the physical phenomena they study (i.e. the way the 
phenomena behave). Financial economics is a bit different since the financial reality is a 
social construction, which is built from conceptual frameworks. Consequently, scientists 
influence the way the phenomena they study behave. In this context, the EMH is an 
idealistic framework that has been used as a theoretical framework for implementing the 
computerization of financial markets (Schinckus, 2008), the international standardization 
of accounting conventions (Chane-Alune, 2006; Miburn, 2008), the legal policies in US 
(Hammer & Groeber, 2007; Jovanovic et al., 2015) and financial regulation policies 
(Muniesa, 2003; Pardo-Guerra, 2015).  
 
In this perspective, coming back with our comments about methodology, models and 
concepts in finance have more interpretative role than the ones used in physics. Derman 
(2001, 2009) also emphasizes this opposition in his comparison of the way of modelling 
in finance and in physics: while physicists implement causal (drawing causal inference) 
or phenomenological (pragmatic analogies) models in their description of the physical 
world, financial economists use interpretative models to “transform intuitive linear 
quantities into non-linear stable values” (Derman, 2009, p. 30). Finances try “to solve a 
relative-value problem rather than an absolute-value problem” as in physics (Derman, 
2001, p. 477). Physicists aim at describing a given world (i.e. a world that cannot be 
influenced by the observers) whereas economists try to interpolate a reactive system by 
pricing assets by using relative relations between the phenomena studied.  
 
Using the EMH as an idealistic framework leads to conserve Fama (1970) definition in 
order to find ways for increasing the access to information or its incorporation into the 
prices. By contrary, using the definition suggested by Jensen (1978) or Malkiel (1992) 
which focuses on the possibility to make out-profit leads to increase the dialogue 
between econophysicists and financial economists. Precisely, the contemporary 
theoretical framework in finance (Harrison & Kreps, 1979; Harrison & Pliska, 1981) is not 
based on the definition of the EMH provided by Fama but rather on the absence of profit 
opportunity (called arbitrage-free) and of martingale measure. In this perspective, an 
arbitrage opportunity is a self-financing trading strategy such as a portfolio has a value 
equal to zero at the beginning can have a positive value at the end. Precisely, Harrison, 
Kreps and Pliska showed that a market is arbitrage-free (efficient) if there exists at least 
one martingale measure. This means that in a market free of arbitrage the stochastic 
price process for financial assets must have at least one martingale measure 
Consequently, keeping the clear distinction between the EMH and the Gaussian 
processes leads to maintain financial economics and econophysics in a common 
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framework, inviting econophysicists to focus on the compatibility between their models 
and the contemporary theoretical framework in finance such as defined by Harrison, 
Kreps and Pliska (Harrison & Kreps, 1979; Harrison & Pliska, 1981).  
 
The reason for keeping Gaussian stochastic processes refers to statistical tests. 
Statistical tests are a major scientific criterion for economists. To date, although 
econophysicists have developed several models mainly based on power laws, they 
traditionally use visual tests based on a double logarithmic axes histogram. These tests 
consist of comparing graphs deduced from observation with graphs deduced from the 
results of the models8. One of the reasons of this situation is that until the very recent 
period, no statistical test comparable to those used in financial economics was 
developed in the stable Levy framework, which implied to use the General Central Limit 
Theorem. Therefore, such tests are in their infancy, while Gaussian framework offers 
this opportunity for a very long time because they are based on the Central Limit 
Theorem.  
 
Both approaches have their own drawbacks: financial economists are more concern by 
statistical tests, while econophysicists, originally trained in statistical physics, are more 
concerned by simulations as close as possible to empirical observations. In their 
perspective, econophysicists have mainly focused on visual comparisons, which 
generates significant systematic errors when we have to insure that they identify the 
considered variable distribution (Clauset, et al., 2009; Gillespie, 2014; Stumpf & Porter, 
2012) and which do not have enough scientific foundations from the perspective of 
financial economists (Durlauf, 2005; Jovanovic & Schinckus, 2015, 2016; LeBaron, 
2001).  
 
While visual tests are the most common in the econophysics’ literature, it is worth 
mentioning that some econophysicists use statistical tests. One can mention, among 
other works, Redelico et al. (2009) and Gligor and Ausloos (2007) who used the 
Student's t-test; Clippe and Ausloos (2012) and Mir et al. (2014) who used a chi-square 
test; and also Queiros (2005), Zanin et al. (2012), Theiler et al. (1992) or Morales et al. 
(2013). However, as some econophysicists pointed out, “better and more careful testing 
is needed, and that too much of data analysis in this area relies on visual inspection 
alone” (Farmer & Geanakoplos, 2008, p. 24).  
 
Developing new statistical tests for non-Gaussian models is one of the major issues for 
the two disciplines. From a financial economics’ viewpoint, several problems exist in 
order to develop statistical tests dedicated to power laws (Broda et al., 2013, p. 293). In 
this perspective, financial economists look dependant on their current models based on 
Gaussian distribution because of the tests currently available. The desire for developing 
new statistical tests is finally very poor, particularly because it could take time before 
publishing a good article in a top journal. 
 
 
                                            
8 For a discussion, see LeBaron (2001), Stanley and Plerou (2001), Mitzenmacher (2004), Newman 
(2005), Durlauf (2005), Clauset et al. (2009) and Jovanovic and Schinckus (2016). 
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VI) CONCLUSION 
 
This article has studied confusions that are largely widespread in the econophysics 
literature about financial economics, and vice versa. As we saw, both communities do 
not share the same scientific culture; this situation generated many oppositions between 
econophysicists and economists. These misunderstandings fuel the current deaf 
dialogue between the two scholar communities. However, this paper has shown the 
necessity to compare what is comparable. With this purpose, surprisingly, econophysics 
and financial economics have more in common than it is generally suggested in the 
literature. Part of their researches shares a calibration approach rooted in a bottom-up 
approach although their approaches are different. Concerning the EMH, by making a 
clear distinction between this hypothesis and the Gaussian processes the two disciplines 
can easily focus on common goals. For instance, while the rejection of Gaussian 
processes by econophysicists has led some of them (Lux & Ausloos, 2002; Vandewalle 
& Ausloos, 1997) to develop models away from the classical Brownian motion, going to 
fractional Brownian motion (and multifractals), we could expect that they try to integrate 
their results in the theoretical framework in finance such as defined by Harrison, Kreps 
and Pliska (Harrison & Kreps, 1979; Harrison & Pliska, 1981). As pointed out, financial 
economists are aware for keeping a link with the Gaussian framework in order to use 
statistical tests considered as strong enough. However, common research is still 
necessary in order to reduce the gap between the two frameworks and to develop fruitful 
collaborations. 
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